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Author: ACC Paul Talbot
Date: 1 October 2026
As Assistant Chief Constable of Staffordshire Police and Chair of this Accelerated Misconduct Hearing, I have considered all the documentary evidence provided, the submissions advanced on behalf of the Appropriate Authority and the written representations submitted by the officer pursuant to Regulation 54 and together with oral evidence from the officer and submissions from the solicitor who represents the officer.
I have carefully considered the factual circumstances surrounding the making of the restraining order, the officer's representations concerning the basis upon which he consented to the order being made, and the legal authorities relied upon by both parties.
The purpose of police misconduct proceedings is not to punish officers but to uphold public confidence in and the reputation of the police service, uphold high standards in policing and deter misconduct and protect the public. My task is to determine, on the balance of probabilities, whether the conduct alleged is proven, whether it amounts to a breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour of Discreditable Conduct and, if so, whether it amounts to misconduct or gross misconduct.
The allegation engages:
Earlier this year, following the prosecution offering no evidence, the officer was acquitted of a criminal offence. Following their acquittal, a restraining order under section 5A Protection from Harassment Act 1997 was imposed on the officer for a period of eight years by a local court. The order prevented the officer having contact with named persons and prohibited his attendance at specified locations.
I note that the Appropriate Authority does not invite me to determine whether the original allegations were true. Rather, the conduct relied upon is the fact that a restraining order was imposed following acquittal.
I have been advised that in the absence of some significant fresh evidence or other exceptional circumstances, I cannot go behind that order and re-litigate the matter, (Shepherd v The Law Society 1996 and Kirk v Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons).
No exceptional circumstances or fresh evidence is available, and I have not re-litigated the matter.
The officer does not dispute that a restraining order was made at the court, and he does not dispute the terms of that restraining order.
The officer provided a Regulation 54 response.
The officer’s position is that they accepted that the restraining order was made by the court. The officer denied they had committed any criminal act and stated that the consented to the making of the restraining order to prevent reluctant witnesses having to give evidence in criminal proceedings. The imposition of the restraining order brought those criminal proceedings to an end.
The officer stated that the evidence of the witnesses in the criminal proceedings had not been tested. The restraining order was made as a preventative measure and there was no evidence that the officer had engaged in any harassing behaviour towards the persons named in the order.
The officer maintained that their conduct did not breach the Standard of Professional Behaviour and was neither Gross Misconduct nor Misconduct.
The case of Iteshi v Bar Standards Board has been cited.
Iteshi states that a Restriction of Proceedings Order was “behaviour” that was capable of amounting to a breach of Core Duty 5 in circumstances where Mr Iteshi had not attended to contest the making of such an order.
Iteshi relates to an order made by the Attorney General and can be distinguished from the present case.
I have placed no reliance on the case of Iteshi.
I have reminded myself that good character arises from the lack of any previous findings against the officer.
Good character is not a defence to the allegation, but it is relevant to my consideration of the case in two ways. First, the officer has given evidence. Their good character is a positive feature of the officer which I have taken into account when considering whether I accepted what they told me. Secondly, the fact that the officer has not offended in the past may make it less likely that he acted as is now alleged against them.
I have received and reviewed a bundle of statements from people who know the officer. It is clear from this bundle that these witnesses have assessed the officer to be a person of good character.
I have concluded from this character assessment that the officer has no propensity towards dishonesty and is held in high regard. There are no concerns regarding the officer’s credibility.
I have listened to the evidence that the officer has given as to how the restraining order came to be made. There is nothing to undermine what the officer has said, and I fully accept the account that he has given.
The following facts are accepted, and I find them to be proven-
I reminded myself that the burden of proving the case is on the Appropriate Authority. The officer does not have to prove anything. The standard of proof is the civil standard, that is on the balance of probabilities
I have considered all the evidence in this case including details of the restraining order which prevents the officer having contact with named persons or attending specified locations. The officer accepts that the restraining order was made by the court and accepts the terms of the order.
I find the particulars of the allegation proven.
I then must consider whether the facts proved amount to a breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour.
I have reminded myself that in order to prove a breach of the Standard relating to Discreditable Conduct, it is not necessary to prove that actual discredit has been brought to the police service; it is sufficient that the officer’s behaviour had the potential to do so.
Members of the public would reasonably expect police officers to be able to have contact with any person of their choosing and not be subject to any judicial restriction as to who they can contact.
The restraining order in this case was imposed for a substantial period of eight years and prohibits contact with named persons and attendance at specified locations.
Although the criminal allegations were not proven, the existence of the order is a matter of public record and reflects a judicial determination that protective measures were necessary.
Members of the public hold police officers to a high moral code and I cannot see how the presence of a restraining order on a serving police officer would not undermine public confidence in policing and the existence of a restraining order officer would adversely affect the confidence of safeguarding partners and the wider community and discredit the police service. Consequently, on the balance of probabilities, I find the facts proven amount to a breach of the Standard of Professional Behaviour relating to Discreditable Conduct.
I now go onto make a provisional assessment of seriousness by reference to culpability and harm.
Culpability – The officer agreed to the restraining order being made. The officer signed a document confirming that they understood that the order could have an impact on their professional career.
I, however, note that the officer has given the reasons as to why he agreed to the making of the order and there is nothing to undermine what the officer says in that regard.
I also note that under Section 5A Protection from Harassment Act the court could have made the order without the officer’s consent.
The officer is responsible for the restraining order being imposed.
I assess the culpability as high.
Harm – The court imposed a restraining order on the officer who is a serving police officer. Members of the public would not expect that a serving police officer would be subject to a restraining order and have restrictions on who they could associate with or where they could not attend. This would have the effect of undermining public confidence in policing.
I assess the harm as high.
I have reminded myself that gross misconduct is a breach of the Standard of Professional Behaviour so serious that the sanction of dismissal without notice could be justified. Misconduct is defined as a breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour that is so serious as to justify disciplinary action.
I am satisfied that the breach of the Standard of Professional Behaviour of Discreditable Conduct amounts to gross misconduct.
In making my decision on outcome I adopt the three-stage process, as outlined in the College of Policing's Guidance on Outcomes in Police Misconduct Proceedings to determine the appropriate sanction.
The first stage is to assess the seriousness of the conduct.
This is assessed by reference to:
The second stage is to keep in mind the purpose of the police misconduct regime. I remind myself this has three elements:
I further remind myself that the police misconduct regime is not designed to punish police officers – it is about the reputation and standing of the profession as a whole.
The third stage is to choose the outcome that most appropriately fulfils that purpose given the seriousness of the conduct in question.
I start by assessing the seriousness of the conduct:
Under Section 5A Protection from Harassment Act 1997 “A court before which a person is acquitted of an offence may, if it considers it necessary to do so to protect a person from harassment by the defendant, make an order prohibiting the defendant from doing anything described in the order”.
The court did not need the officer to consent to the making of the restraining order; the court had the power to impose the order without consent. But it is noted that the officer consented to the making of the restraining order after receiving legal advice and being advised of the potential professional implications.
The restraining order relates to three people and arises from concerns considered sufficiently serious by the District Judge for judicial intervention.
I assess the culpability as high.
The primary harm is reputational.
Public confidence is likely to be significantly affected where a serving police officer is subject to a court order preventing contact with named persons. Safeguarding agencies and members of the public would reasonably question the compatibility of such restrictions with continued service.
It is the job of a police officer to uphold the law and protect the public from harassment.
I find that the breach of the Standard of Professional Behaviour that has been proven against the officer would harm public confidence if the circumstances were known to the public.
I have found that the breach amounts to gross misconduct and could have caused serious harm to public confidence if the circumstances were known and that the factor of greatest importance is the impact of the misconduct on the standing and reputation of the profession as a whole.
I assess the harm as high.
When considering the aggravating factors, I am mindful not to double count matters that have already formed part of my assessment of harm and culpability.
I do not find any aggravating factors.
I have listened and accepted the officer’s reason as to why he agreed to the imposition of the restraining order.
I have also taken account of the fact that the officer was acquitted of the criminal allegations and no criminal conviction followed. The misconduct proceedings arise from the existence of the restraining order itself rather than any finding that a criminal allegation occurred.
I note that the court did not need the officer’s consent to make the restraining order.
Whilst these factors do not diminish the impact upon public confidence arising from the existence of the order, they are relevant considerations when assessing the overall seriousness of the conduct and determining the appropriate outcome.
I find that there are mitigating factors.
I note the officer’s explanation as to why they consented to the making of the restraining order and that they believed that they were acting in the best interests of all persons concerned.
I note that the officer is in a settled relationship with children.
I am mindful of the limits to the weight I should attach to personal mitigation as identified in the College of Policing’s Guidance on Outcomes in Police Misconduct Proceedings and that the interests of the police service and the protection of the public are more important than those of the individual officer.
Taking all these matters into consideration, I assess the seriousness of the conduct as high.
I have reminded myself of the threefold purpose of the police misconduct regime carefully in considering the appropriate outcome in this case.
I further remind myself that the police misconduct regime is not designed to punish police officers. It is about the reputation and standing of the profession as a whole.
I do acknowledge that the outcome imposed can have a punitive effect: accordingly, the outcome should be no more than necessary to satisfy the purpose of the proceedings.
I have considered the officer’s record of service and reminded myself that they have no previous findings of misconduct.
I have considered the matter fully, including the nature and severity of the breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour.
The college of Policing guidance on police misconduct hearings reminds me that I must look at the appropriateness of the least onerous sanction before going on to consider the more onerous sanctions and always choose the least severe outcome.
I have considered a whether a final written waring would serve to mark the seriousness of the misconduct and deter others from similar misconduct and fulfil the purposes of the police misconduct regime.
After considering the matter fully, including the nature of the breach of the Professional Standard of Behaviour, I do not find that that a final written warning would serve to mark the seriousness of the misconduct and fulfil the purposes of the police misconduct regime.
The breach relates to the imposition of a restraining order on a serving police officer that lasts until 2034 which is a considerable period of time.
The public would not expect that a serving police officer would have a restraining order made against him which restricts who he can have contact with and places he can attend.
The imposition of a restraining order on a police officer is irreconcilable with that officer’s continued service in the police service.
The outcome of the office’s breach of the Professional Standard of Behaviour means that I do not consider that any sanction less than dismissal without notice is justified.
Having considered all the evidence, I find that the making of a section 5A Protection from Harassment Act 1997 restraining order, accepted by the officer and remaining in force until February 2034, constitutes conduct which has engaged the disciplinary jurisdiction and amounts to a breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour relating to Discreditable Conduct.
I am satisfied that the breach will cause significant damage to public confidence in policing and to the reputation of the police service. The existence of a court order preventing a serving police officer from contacting named persons is fundamentally inconsistent with the standards expected of police officers.
I noted the words of Lord Carswell in R (Green) v Police Complaints Authority, in relation to the police service: ‘Public confidence in the police is a factor of great importance in the maintenance of law and order in the manner which we regard as appropriate in our polity. If citizens feel that improper behaviour on the part of police officers is left unchecked and they are not held accountable for it in a suitable manner, that confidence will be eroded.”
I conclude that the seriousness of the breach of the Professional Standard of Behaviour of Discreditable Conduct means that I do not consider that any sanction less than Dismissal Without Notice is justified.
Therefore, the sanction I impose on the officer is dismissal without notice and that he be placed on the College of Policing's Barred List.
The officer has a right of appeal against the outcome under the following circumstances: - a) the finding or outcome was unreasonable; b) there is evidence that could not reasonably have been considered at the original hearing which could have materially affected the finding or decision on disciplinary action; or c) there was a breach of the procedures or other unfairness which could have materially affected the finding or decision on outcome.
Should they wish to appeal this must be done to the Police Appeals Tribunal by writing to the Police and Crime Commissioner, Staffordshire Office for Policing and Crime within 10 working days beginning with the day after receipt of this notice. Please note that the tribunal can increase any outcome imposed as well as reduce or overturn the decision of the chair. You have the right to be legally represented at the appeal hearing.