



10 June 2026

FOI Ref 22963

Request - You asked Staffordshire Police (SP) the following:

Please provide an up-to-date fleet list for your force.

I request that the information include:

- Full vehicle registration mark (VRM)
- Vehicle role
- Whether the vehicle is marked, unmarked or covert

This request applies to all vehicles currently held within the fleet.

For clarity, I am not requesting information relating to deployments, tactics, operational activity, station allocations, ongoing investigations or any other operational details. This request relates solely to fleet asset information.

SP received your request on 05/06/2026 and have processed this under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

SP's response to your enquiry is as follows:

SP holds the requested information.

- Please provide an up-to-date fleet list for your force.
- I request that the information include:
 - Full vehicle registration mark (VRM) – **Withheld, please see the below exemptions.**
 - Vehicle role
 - Whether the vehicle is marked, unmarked or covert
 - **Partially disclosed, please see the accompanying file titled 'FOI 22963 Fleet Information Data'. Please see the below exemptions.**
- This request applies to all vehicles currently held within the fleet.
- For clarity, I am not requesting information relating to deployments, tactics, operational activity, station allocations, ongoing investigations or any other operational details. This request relates solely to fleet asset information.

Please be advised that where there are blank fields in the 'Vehicle Role' column this is where these vehicles are not allocated to specific department at this moment in time.

All Freedom of Information request responses are published on the SP website although personal details are not included.



The following exemptions have been applied:

In accordance with Section 17(1) of the Freedom of Information Act, this letter represents a refusal notice for parts of this particular request.

- Section 24 (1) – National Security

Section 24 is a qualified exemption and as such there is a requirement to articulate the harm and conduct a test of the public interest.

- Section 31 (1)(a)(b) - Law Enforcement

Information is exempt from disclosure under S31(1)(a)(b) where the release of Information would, or would likely to, prejudice the prevention and detection of crime and/or the apprehension or prosecution of offenders. This exemption is qualified and prejudice-based and, as such, we are required to evidence the harm in disclosure and apply the public interest test.

Harm:

SP have a duty to prevent crime, apprehend and prosecute offenders whilst carrying out the administration of justice. To reveal the specific details requested would identify the number of vehicles used for covert/armed response purposes would therefore give the criminal fraternity, or individuals intent upon causing disruption, access to valuable data upon the potential tactical capability or capacity of SP. This would then indicate the level of tactical options open and available to the force and thus arm individuals with criminal intent, the intelligence required to disrupt Police activity or evade detection and therefore render law enforcement activities less effective. This, in turn, would place members of the public and officers employed in such roles at an increased risk of harm.

Disclosure of full information on fleet, such as full VRNs, could be of intelligence value to a person or persons with criminal or malicious intent. Full disclosure could provide and enable targeted malicious actions, be that some form of attack on an operational unit or avoiding that unit for example where strengths and weakness may be perceived (whether incorrectly or not).

Although VRNs are an overtly displayed marker that can be clearly seen and are intended to be seen, to disclose a ready-collated list of vehicles with complete vehicle registration numbers would be substantially more harmful than the limited availability of related information via the visibility of vehicles whilst on public roads. In practice, all of this information is not realistically accessible to a member of the public and is therefore not in the public domain.

Disclosure of detailed fleet information such as VRNs would be of intelligence value to individuals or groups with criminal or malicious intent. While VRNs are visible on public roads, publishing a ready-collated list of all fleet details provides a far greater level of insight than is realistically accessible to the public. This would allow offenders to:

- Clone VRNs to avoid tolls, congestion charges, or commit offences while appearing legitimate.
- Identify specialist vehicles (e.g., Armed Response or Roads Policing Units) and adapt tactics to evade or target them.
- Compromise covert operations by making unmarked vehicles easier to identify.
- Exploit post-service risks, as many police vehicles are sold at auction; knowledge of specifications and VRNs could enable impersonation of officers or misuse of residual equipment.



- Reverse engineer security systems: This means studying ex-police vehicles to learn how their security features work—such as wiring, electronics, or software—and using that knowledge to copy, bypass, or exploit those systems in active vehicles.
- Build a national mosaic picture of fleet composition and operational strength, undermining law enforcement capability.

Additionally, law enforcement tactics and operational capability would be compromised with the disclosure of VRN details requested such as that relating to unmarked cars, as those who wish to commit criminal acts will be more aware of what vehicles may belong to the force in a covert role, that assist with preventing and detecting crime.

Such a disclosure would allow those with criminal intent the ability to build up a mosaic picture of force capabilities and resources and use this information to undermine law enforcement. This places the community at increased unnecessary risk of harm and impacts on police resources if additional resources and tactics need to be put in place to counter any harm caused by an adverse FOIA disclosure.

Public Interest Test

Factors favouring disclosure under Section 24(1)

Disclosure would promote transparency and accountability in how public funds are spent on fleet procurement. It may also increase public confidence in policing by demonstrating openness and supporting informed public debate about resource allocation.

Factors favouring non-disclosure under Section 24(1)

Detailed fleet information could assist hostile actors in targeting law enforcement vehicles, which would undermine national security. Knowledge of VRNs and other fleet information could enable cyberattacks on manufacturers or fleets, creating vulnerabilities in emergency response and critical infrastructure. Furthermore, disclosure could facilitate reverse engineering of security systems, significantly increasing the risk of exploitation by organised crime or terrorist groups.

Factors favouring disclosure under Section 31(1)(a)(b)

There is a legitimate public interest in the public being satisfied that the police force has up to date and well-maintained vehicles to deliver services to the public when and where required. To disclose the tactical specialist vehicles used by SP would give the public confidence that public money was being spent on the most appropriate type of vehicles.

Factors favouring non-disclosure under Section 31(1)(a)(b)

The Police Service has a duty to deliver effective law enforcement ensuring that the prevention and detection of crime, apprehension or prosecution of offenders and administration of justice is carried out appropriately.

Disclosing information that would allow the identification of all vehicles may reveal what resources are available for a given role and this information could enable police strength to be determined and circumvented by those intent on committing crime. Additionally, to disclose specific details regarding



specialist vehicles would enable criminals to know the capability, the number and types of vehicles used for specialist tactical purposes by SP, which would jeopardise the ability of the police to carry out their duty. Disclosure would undermine policing and have a negative effect on the prevention and detection of crime and the apprehension and prosecution of offenders. It is widely known that police forces use specialist vehicles as part of their delivery of effective operational law enforcement, however, to reveal the number and details of such vehicles would reveal tactical resources available and their distribution by role across the force. This would allow the criminal fraternity to draw conclusions about the forces capacity with regard to specialist vehicles available. If this request was submitted nationally and the information disclosed this awareness would provide a geographical picture of the tactical specialist resources available to each force.

Balance test

It is not in the public interest for law enforcement tactics and operational capability to be compromised with the disclosure of Fleet VRNs, as those who wish to commit criminal acts will be more aware of the vehicles in operation to assist with preventing and detecting crime.

Such a disclosure that would allow those with criminal intent the ability to build up a mosaic picture of force capabilities and resources which could be used to undermine law enforcement. This would not be in the public interest.

Disclosure is also not in the public interest as it places the community at increased unnecessary risk of harm and impacts on police resources. This is especially the case if additional tactics/resources need to be put in place to counter harm caused by an adverse FOIA request regarding police vehicles.

Freedom of Information Request Appeals Procedure

1. Who Can Ask for a Review

Any person who has requested information from SP, which has been dealt with under the Freedom of Information Act, is entitled to complain and request an internal review, if they are dissatisfied with the response they received.

2. How to Request a Review

Requests for review of a Freedom of Information request must be made in writing within two months of the date of receipt of this email, and should be addressed to:

IAT@staffordshire.police.uk

Or by Post to:

Information Access Team
Staffordshire Police HQ
PO Box 3167
Stafford
ST16 9JZ



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The reference number, date of the request and details of why the review is being requested must be included. Requests for review should be brought to the attention of the Information Access Team within two months of the SP response to the original FOI request.

3. Review Procedure

Receipt of a request for review will be acknowledged in writing. The review will be conducted by a supervisor who is independent from the original Decision Maker. The Information Access Team will set a target date for a response. The response will be made as soon as is practicable with the intention to complete the review within twenty working days. In more complex cases the review may take up to forty working days.

The independent supervisor will conduct a review of the handling of the request for information and of decisions taken, including decisions taken about where the public interest lies in respect of exempt information where applicable. The review enables a re-evaluation of the case, considering the matters raised by the complaint.

4. Conclusion of the Appeal

On completion of the review the independent supervisor will reply to the appellant with the result of the review. If the appellant is still dissatisfied following the review they should contact the Information Commissioner to make an appeal. The Information Commissioner can be contacted via the following link: <https://ico.org.uk/make-a-complaint/foi-and-eir-complaints/foi-and-eir-complaints/>

Freedom of Information
Information Access Team