



STAFFORDSHIRE
POLICE

6 August 2026

FOI Ref 23195

Request - You asked Staffordshire Police (SP) the following:

I refer you to the following Report dated 29th May 2026 :

Accessed here

<https://eur02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublications.parliament.uk%2Fpa%2Fcm5902%2Fcmselect%2Fcmpubacc%2F91%2Freport.html%23heading-6&data=05%7C02%7Cfoi%40Staffordshire.police.uk%7C80a1dafb6ba14a50b97908deed64802f%7Cd492250406c0431d8eca67087dea03c8%7C0%7C0%7C639209213089280170%7CUnknown%7CTWfpgZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUslIYiOilwLjAuMDAwMCIsIAiOiJXaW4zMilslkFOljoiTWFpbClslldUljoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=MY%2BCvdukojky5cOIJQ3sVhxEymse9jnVtNWZUW29hjc%3D&reserved=0>

and here

https://eur02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcommittees.parliament.uk%2Fcommittee%2F127%2Fpublic-accounts-committee%2Fnews%2F213810%2Fmods-lack-of-focus-and-leadership-leaves-valuable-public-funds-exposed-to-fraud%3Futm_id%3D97758_v0_s00_e227_tv2_tp1_a1den1nlqi3bqr%26fbclid%3DIwY2xjawSLkkxleHRuA2FibQlXMAbicmlkETFIQnByWVhYYjNhNkRCY3h2c3J0YwZhcHBfaWQQMjlyMDM5MTc4ODlwMDg5MgABHveBX_Nmm0Tj1y2EtRmLOYjZJHFW1JlJx03BtXzHjIHnYwsWJ3sy-MDBlWX3_aem_q0esiqhV1j2HF2kHYkCG9g&data=05%7C02%7Cfoi%40Staffordshire.police.uk%7C80a1dafb6ba14a50b97908deed64802f%7Cd492250406c0431d8eca67087dea03c8%7C0%7C0%7C639209213089314635%7CUnknown%7CTWfpgZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUslIYiOilwLjAuMDAwMCIsIAiOiJXaW4zMilslkFOljoiTWFpbClslldUljoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=DZ5JKNp3aOfrr21mXRzi%2FfjsB32k8x2mrt5%2BP3CBCqgw%3D&reserved=0

The Public Accounts Committee says: The MoD's £1.5bn/year potential fraud risk is huge, and the steps the Department has taken to address this have not shown clear, sustained leadership. The report identifies historic issues which have been inconsistently addressed, such as siloed working, weak ownership and a lack of trust between the different parts of the MoD responsible for tackling fraud and economic crime.

Witnesses

I highlight this witnesses testimony, the other witnesses broadly concur. Please see the full text within the Report.

Andrew Feinstein is Executive Director of Shadow World Investigations, a London-based not-for-profit that investigates corruption in the global arms trade. Andrew is author of "The Shadow World: Inside the Global Arms Trade" regarded as the definitive book on the subject of corruption in the arms trade, amongst other titles. SWI wrote the first account of corruption in the arms trade for the gold standard of arms export data and analysis, the SIPRI Yearbook. We have advised and/or trained the Norwegian Council on Ethics, the Norwegian Auditor-General's Office, the Serious Fraud Office and numerous prosecutors around the

world. Andrew was the ranking ANC member on the Public Accounts Committee in South Africa's first and second democratic Parliaments.

He led the PAC's investigation into a £6 billion arms deal that was mired in high level corruption involving, amongst others, BAE Systems. The investigation led to the imprisonment of two senior officials and an on-going corruption trial of the country's former President, Jacob Zuma, in which Andrew is the State's primary witness. He chaired the committee that drafted the Public Finance Management Act, which created the country's financial management and oversight architecture.

Countries A. F. Identified as lead corrupt countries

Saudi Arabia, Israel, India and the UAE – the biggest purchasers of British weapons along with the United States - have over many decades been identified as amongst the most corrupt countries involved in the arms trade. Israel is also a significant supplier of defence equipment and training to Britain.

A.F. Notes

Similarly, despite defence contractor Moog being charged by the SEC for a subsidiary's role in an Indian defence bribery scheme, the company holds UK licences to export components for trainer aircraft, and they contribute to the global F-35 programme. Moog UK's compliance manager has had oversight of both Moog UK and Moog India since before and during the period when the Indian company was found to be bribing state officials.

A.F Further comments

There are numerous other cases that I could enunciate to make the point that defence procurement remains a site of significant on-going fraud and economic crime. This is exacerbated by the movement of people between defence companies and the state, including the MoD. This practice is often referred to as a revolving door, and creates opportunities for conflicts of interest, inappropriate, sometimes illegal, gifts and hospitality, and post-employment jobs or payments for procurement decisions made while employed by the State.

The current functioning of the MoD, as described in the NAO report and briefly in this submission, undermines state fiscal management and the rule of law.

The order by the PAC committee to the Head of the MOD - included cooperation between the MOD Police and civil policing authorities.

Questions

1) Since Israeli and US owned Defence companies are named in this report. Elbit Engine Systems Ltd Shenstone Staffordshire, is an Israeli arms company. Moog Inc Wolverhampton is a US company. What help have Staffordshire Police offered to either PAC or the MOD to get to the bottom of this Fraud?

2) Has there been any contact at all between Staffordshire Police, and the MOD in Staffordshire or nationally, and/or any other civil authorities over this Fraud, if not, how is this absence of cooperation being addressed?

As the first question deals with the concept of help, and the second with any form of contact on this subject, I would be grateful if the answers were specific to each question.

SP received your request on 29/07/2026 and have processed this under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

SP's response to your enquiry is as follows:

SP does not hold the requested information.

Questions

- 1) Since Israeli and US owned Defence companies are named in this report. Elbit Engine Systems Ltd Shenstone Staffordshire, is an Israeli arms company. Moog Inc Wolverhampton is a US company. What help have Staffordshire Police offered to either PAC or the MOD to get to the bottom of this Fraud?
- **No information held. Please see the advice and assistance below.**
- 2) Has there been any contact at all between Staffordshire Police, and the MOD in Staffordshire or nationally, and/or any other civil authorities over this Fraud, if not, how is this absence of cooperation being addressed?
- **No information held. Please see the advice and assistance below.**

As the first question deals with the concept of help, and the second with any form of contact on this subject, I would be grateful if the answers were specific to each question.

All Freedom of Information request responses are published on the SP website although personal details are not included.

Advice and assistance

Section 16 of the Act places an obligation upon the Authority to provide advice and assistance, in order to comply with this obligation please see below.

SP is unable to provide data regarding fraud offences as these are now recorded by Report Fraud. Report Fraud is the national centre responsible for receiving, recording and disseminating reports of fraud.

Report Fraud is handled by the City of London Police. You may seek the information you are requesting by contacting their FOI department at <https://www.cityoflondon.police.uk/foi-ai/af/accessing-information/>

Freedom of Information Request Appeals Procedure

1. Who Can Ask for a Review

Any person who has requested information from SP, which has been dealt with under the Freedom of Information Act, is entitled to complain and request an internal review, if they are dissatisfied with the response they received.

2. How to Request a Review

Requests for review of a Freedom of Information request must be made in writing within two months of the date of receipt of this email, and should be addressed to:

IAT@staffordshire.police.uk

Or by Post to:



STAFFORDSHIRE
POLICE

Information Access Team
Staffordshire Police HQ
PO Box 3167
Stafford
ST16 9JZ

The reference number, date of the request and details of why the review is being requested must be included. Requests for review should be brought to the attention of the Information Access Team within two months of the SP response to the original FOI request.

3. Review Procedure

Receipt of a request for review will be acknowledged in writing. The review will be conducted by a supervisor who is independent from the original Decision Maker. The Information Access Team will set a target date for a response. The response will be made as soon as is practicable with the intention to complete the review within twenty working days. In more complex cases the review may take up to forty working days.

The independent supervisor will conduct a review of the handling of the request for information and of decisions taken, including decisions taken about where the public interest lies in respect of exempt information where applicable. The review enables a re-evaluation of the case, considering the matters raised by the complaint.

4. Conclusion of the Appeal

On completion of the review the independent supervisor will reply to the appellant with the result of the review. If the appellant is still dissatisfied following the review they should contact the Information Commissioner to make an appeal. The Information Commissioner can be contacted via the following link:
<https://ico.org.uk/make-a-complaint/foi-and-eir-complaints/foi-and-eir-complaints/>

Freedom of Information
Information Access Team