

1 July 2025

FOI Ref 21510

Request - You asked us the following:

A) The number of reports of 3D-printed firearms each calendar year since 2020, including a total for 2025 so far.

B) The number of 3D-printed firearms recovered each calendar year since 2020, including a total for 2025 so far.

We received your request on 27/06/2025 and have processed this under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

Staffordshire Police's response to your enquiry is as follows:

The following exemption has been applied:

In accordance with Section 17(1) of the Freedom of Information Act, this letter represents a refusal notice for this particular request.

- Section 21(1) - Information reasonably accessible by other means. Please see advice and assistance below.

Section 21 is an absolute, class-based exemption and as such there is no requirement to quantify the harm that may arise from the disclosure, nor is there a requirement to perform a Public Interest Test.

Staffordshire Police can neither confirm nor deny whether any further information relevant to this request is held, as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 does not apply by virtue of the following exemptions:

- Section 23(5) Information supplied by or concerning certain Security Bodies

Section 23 is a class based absolute exemption and there is no requirement to consider the public interest in this case.

- Section 24(2) National Security
- Section 31(3) Law Enforcement

Sections 24 and 31 are qualified exemptions and as such there is a requirement to articulate the harm and conduct a test of the public interest in confirmation or denial.

Public Interest Test

Evidence of Harm

Confirmation or denial that information is held would identify local level activity regarding the use and/or seizure of 3D printed weapons. In turn this risks identifying the level of police awareness of such weapons

in the force area. When the request is made to multiple forces, there is a further risk in that confirmation or denial would reveal information which could be used to build a picture as to where national and local investigations and operations are taking place, and perhaps more pertinently where they are not, to combat the supply, distribution and use of these weapons. This mapping effect, created by forces either confirming information is held and citing a substantive exemption or, conversely, stating 'no information held', would undermine the effective delivery of operational law enforcement by revealing the intelligence picture of the force in respect of 3D printed firearms as well as compromising potentially ongoing investigations, some of which may be covert.

Disclosure of information under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) is considered a release to the world at large and not a private transaction. Whilst not questioning an applicant's motives in this case, by making a public disclosure under FOI, it must be considered that as well as members of the public, criminals, including terrorists will be able to access the data released. It is widely known that organised criminal gangs and those involved in terrorist related activity monitor FOI disclosures closely for any information they can use to further their criminal activity.

The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It should be recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. The UK faces a sustained threat from violent terrorists and extremists. Since 2006, the UK Government have published the threat level, based upon current intelligence that threat level to the UK currently is 'substantial, meaning an attack is likely.

<https://www.mi5.gov.uk/threat-levels>

Any information identifying the focus of policing activity that could be used to the advantage of criminal organisations, serious and organised crime groups and terrorists to undermine the operational integrity of policing will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on, not only law enforcement at a local level, but policing and operations at a national level the impact of which risks the national security of the UK.

Section 24 (2) National Security

Factors favouring complying with Section 1(1)(a)

Any information that would increase public knowledge in showing how resources are allocated in response to events would favour disclosure. This would also support the fundamental purpose of the Freedom of Information Act, which is to be more open and transparent in the way in which the police perform, making them more accountable for their actions. Releasing any details regarding the seizure of 3D printed firearms would provide reassurance to the public that the police are appropriately resourced in this area and would be in a position to respond to any National Security threats or incidents. Any information which would allow for more accurate public debate would be a positive factor for disclosure.

Factors against complying with Section 1(1)(a)

Whilst there is a public interest in providing reassurance that the police are appropriately and effectively dealing with threats posed by terrorist organisations, there is a strong public interest in safeguarding national security and the welfare and safety of the general public. Any disclosure (including confirming or denying information is held) has the potential to undermine ongoing and future operations to protect the

Security of the United Kingdom, e.g. counter terrorism activity. The risk of significant harm or even death to the community at large would be increased.

The cumulative effect of terrorists gathering information from various sources would build a picture of potential vulnerabilities at a local level. The more information disclosed over time will provide a more detailed account of the investigative focus of not only a force area but also the country as a whole. Any incident which results from such a disclosure would by default affect National Security.

Section 31(3) Law Enforcement

Factors favouring complying with Section 1(1)(a)

There is media reporting concerning the increase of these weapons, 3D guns appearing on British Streets which in itself is a factor supporting confirmation or denial.

To confirm or deny that this information is held would make members of the public more aware of the threat of certain offences and the forces ability to deal with them. Improved public awareness may lead to more intelligence being submitted to police about possible further instances of 3D- printed firearms use and any acts of criminality or perceived terrorism as members of the public will be more observant to suspicious activity which in turn may result in a reduction of crime.

Factors against complying with Section 1(1)(a)

To confirm or deny that the requested information is held could compromise law enforcement tactics which would hinder the Police force's ability to prevent and detect crimes. Whilst such information on its own may be perceived as not harmful, any further information that may be already in the public domain or any that may be asked for in the future could be detrimental to forces and can contribute to the mosaic effect. The 'mosaic' effect is attune to the building up of a jigsaw, from public disclosures and other information, gradually filling in the pieces to form a complete picture. For criminals, including serious and organised crime groups and terrorists to gain easy access to such information would not only undermine the police's primary function of law enforcement but also place the public at significant risk of harm.

Balance Test

To confirm or deny that any such information is held or not held would indicate levels of policing activity at force level which could allow individuals to evaluate levels of activity across individual force areas and exploit what may be considered as less active or resourced areas. If this information is disclosed it continually drip feeds in the pool of information publically available to criminals and terrorists who will use it to complete a full picture on how and where to undertake their criminal pursuits without fear of detection or apprehension.

The security of the country is of paramount importance. The police will not divulge any information that would place the safety of officers or the public at risk or undermine national security. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing, and in this case providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat of activity involving weapons, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding both national security and the integrity of police investigations and operations. It is not in the best interests of the security of the country, individual forces or the public in general to put such information into the public arena where it could be used by those wishing to cause

harm. It is our opinion that for these issues the balancing test for confirming or denying that this information is held, not made out.

No inference can be taken from this refusal that information does or does not exist.

Advice and assistance

In order to comply with our obligations under Section 16 of the Act, the obligation to provide advice and assistance, please find below links to some of the information requested.

- [Man who made guns using 3D printer jailed for more than 10 years | Staffordshire Police](#)

Please be advised that all Freedom of Information request responses are published on the Staffordshire Police website although personal details are not included.

Freedom of Information Request Appeals Procedure

1. Who Can Ask for a Review

Any person who has requested information from Staffordshire Police, which has been dealt with under the Freedom of Information Act, is entitled to complain and request an internal review, if they are dissatisfied with the response they received.

2. How to Request a Review

Requests for review of a Freedom of Information request must be made in writing within two months of the date of receipt of this email, and should be addressed to:

foi@staffordshire.police.uk

Or by Post to:

Central Disclosure Unit
Staffordshire Police HQ
PO Box 3167
Stafford
ST16 9JZ

The reference number, date of the request and details of why the review is being requested must be included. Requests for review should be brought to the attention of the Central Disclosure Unit within two months of the Force's response to the original FOI request.

3. Review Procedure

Receipt of a request for review will be acknowledged in writing. The review will be conducted by another Decision Maker who is independent from the original Decision Maker. The Central Disclosure Unit will set a target date for a response. The response will be made as soon as is practicable with the intention to complete the review within 20 working days. In more complex cases the review may take up to 40 working days.



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The independent Decision Maker will conduct a review of the handling of the request for information and of decisions taken, including decisions taken about where the public interest lies in respect of exempt information where applicable. The review enables a re-evaluation of the case, taking into account the matters raised by the complaint.

4. Conclusion of the Appeal

On completion of the review the Independent Decision maker will reply to the complainant with the result of the review. If the complainant is still dissatisfied following the review they should contact the Information Commissioner to make an appeal. The Information Commissioner can be contacted via the following details:

Information Commissioner's Office
Wycliffe House
Water Lane
Wilmslow
Cheshire
SK9 5AF

ICO Website for complaints link: <https://ico.org.uk/make-a-complaint/foi-and-eir-complaints/foi-and-eir-complaints/>

Freedom of Information
Central Disclosure Unit